Lewis Fogle v. John Sokol by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-21-2020 
Lewis Fogle v. John Sokol 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Lewis Fogle v. John Sokol" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 395. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/395 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 JOHN SOKOL, Pennsylvania State Trooper;  
 MICHAEL STEFFEE, Pennsylvania State Trooper;  
 DONALD BECHWITH, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper;  
 JOSEPH STEPHEN, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper;  
 JOHN BARDROFF, Corporal; 
ANDREW MOLLURA, Corporal;  
 GLENN WALP, Lieutenant, in their individual capacities; 
 COUNTY OF INDIANA, PENNSYLVANIA;  
 GREGORY OLSON, Indiana County District Attorney,  
 in his official and individual capacity;  
 WILLIAM MARTIN, Indiana County Assistant District 
Attorney, in his individual capacity 
 
        County of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Gregory Olson and 
William Martin, 
                           Appellants 
 ______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 2 
 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-00194) 
District Judge: Hon. David S. Cercone 
______________ 
 
Argued September 19, 2019 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, Circuit Judges, 
 and QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO,* District Judge.        
 
(Filed: April 20, 2020) 
 
Anna Benvenutti Hoffmann, Esq. 
Emma K. Freudenberger, Esq. 
Mary K. McCarthy, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Peter J. Neufeld, Esq. 
Neufeld Scheck & Brustin 
99 Hudson Street 
8th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
 
Thomas J. Farrell, Esq. 
Farrell & Reisinger 
300 Koppers Building 
436 Seventh Avenue 
Suite 300 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
 
 
* Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro, District 
Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 3 
 
Michael E. Kennedy, Esq. 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
1251 Waterfront Place 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
Attorney for Defendants Donald Bechwith, 
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper; John Bardroff, 
Corporal; John Sokol, Pennsylvania State Police 
Trooper; Andrew Molllura, Corporal; Michael Steffee, 
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper; and Glenn Walp, 
Lieutenant, in their individual capacities 
 
Marie M. Jones, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Maria N. Pipak, Esq. 
Jones Passodelis 
707 Grant Street 
Gulf Tower, Suite 3410 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants County of Indiana; 
Gregory Olson, Indiana County District Attorney, in his 
official and individual capacity; and William Martin, 
Indiana County Assistant District Attorney, in his 








MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Lewis James Fogle spent more than three decades in 
prison for a crime he says he did not commit. Now free, he 
alleges that his incarceration was no accident, sketching a 
widespread conspiracy by law enforcement officials to violate 
his civil rights. Implicated in this alleged scheme are former 
Indiana County District Attorney Gregory Olson, former 
Indiana County Assistant District Attorney William Martin, 
and their one-time employer, Indiana County. They all raise 
the shield of absolute immunity, a judicially created exception 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the immunity from civil liability 
enjoyed by prosecutors hinges on the sanctity of our judicial 
process, not “any special esteem.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 
118, 127 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). And so 
only truly prosecutorial functions, not investigative conduct, 
justify complete protection from suit. Fogle’s complaint 
alleges acts by Olson and Martin that, taken as true, fall outside 
the narrow doctrine of absolute immunity and survive a motion 
to dismiss. Fogle’s claims against Indiana County survive too 
because there is no exception to the final judgment rule 
allowing us to review municipal liability in this appeal. Thus, 
we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Olson and 
Martin’s motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity and 
dismiss Indiana County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.   
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
We recount only the relevant history, accepting as true, 
as we must, the untested allegations in the complaint.  
 
A. The Crime and the Search  
 
In 1976, a passerby discovered the body of fifteen-year-
old Deann “Kathy” Long in a wooded area near her home in 
Indiana County, Pennsylvania. Kathy’s death was senseless 
and horrific, involving a brutal assault, rape, and finally, a 
gunshot to the head. Swiftly, law enforcement opened an 
investigation with representatives from the Indiana County 
District Attorney’s Office, including Olson and Martin (or 
collectively, “the Prosecutors”), and the Pennsylvania State 
Police (the “State Troopers”). The State Troopers soon learned 
from Kathy’s sisters and family friends “that Kathy was last 
seen getting into a blue car with an unknown man” on the day 
of the crime. (App. at 44.) Two of her sisters, ages nine and 
twelve, described the man “as between 20 and 30 years old, 
with blue eyes, black hair that came below his ears and curled 
at the ends, sideburns, heavy eyebrows, and a heavy mustache 
over his upper lip.”1 (App. at 45.) 
 
Lewis Fogle did not match the description, having 
“straight reddish-blonde hair that dropped down his back and 
a matching, full beard that reached his waist.” (App. at 45.) But 
Fogle’s brother Dennis owned a blue car, and rumors around 
town suggested he “invited a teenage girl to spend the night 
 
1 Kathy’s older sister, Patty, and a friend of the family 
corroborated the two younger sisters’ claim that they had seen 
Kathy get into the car with a man that evening. 
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with him the night after Kathy’s body was found.” (App. at 45.) 
It was a thin clue, and a search of Dennis’s car “found nothing 
of evidentiary value.” (App. at 46.) 
  
A frustrating year passed with little progress. With no 
fresh leads, the investigation turned to Earl Elderkin, known in 
town as “‘Spaceman,’ because he claimed that he and his kids 
were from outer space.” (App. at 46.) Elderkin had drawn 
attention from law enforcement in the days after the murder 
because he fit the description of the unknown man in the blue 
car. Though Elderkin first denied any connection to the crime, 
he eventually claimed to have been present during the attack. 
He offered an alleged eyewitness account, one short on details, 
perhaps owing to his use of drugs and alcohol. He confessed to 
being in the car that picked up a girl at the Long residence and 
witnessing an unidentified man shoot her with a rifle. But soon 
enough, Elderkin failed a polygraph examination, and the 
investigation slowed to a halt.  
 
B. Fogle Becomes the Focus 
 
More than three years passed with no leads. Then, 
Elderkin reappeared, checking himself into a hospital for a 
psychiatric evaluation. There, he asked to speak with police 
about Kathy and offered two more accounts. In one of these 
versions, he implicated sixteen unidentified men; in the other, 
he named two specific individuals, but neither was Lewis 
Fogle. And these new contradictory statements only 
diminished Elderkin’s credibility. His stories included 
variations on the number of people involved in the murder and 
consistently referenced passengers in the blue car, a detail 
Kathy’s sisters never mentioned. Even Elderkin agreed he was 
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unreliable, stating he was not sure whether he had witnessed a 
murder, or merely imagined the whole thing. 
 
But the investigation pressed on. Olson, working with 
the State Troopers, turned to hypnosis to try to clarify 
Elderkin’s stories. Olson’s choice of expert was unusual: an 
English teacher with no formal hypnosis training. Unusual too 
was the actual hypnosis session, with the “hypnotist” acting 
“[a]t the behest of Defendants” to use “undue suggestion to 
obtain a statement from Elderkin.” (App. at 48). But even that 
direction proved insufficient, as Elderkin waffled between 
versions of his earlier statements and a new story implicating, 
for the first time, both Dennis and Lewis Fogle. Following the 
hypnosis sessions, Olson and the State Troopers again 
interviewed Elderkin. And this time, he at last provided a firm 
statement naming the Fogle brothers as two of four attackers. 
That statement became the cornerstone of the investigation. 
 
C. The Scramble to Bolster the Case Against Fogle 
 
Elderkin’s latest statement provided both a new theory 
and obvious challenges. For example, Elderkin’s timeline of 
the crime did not fit the chronology provided by Kathy’s sisters 
and friends. To advance their case, the State Troopers brought 
in Kathy’s older sister, Patty, and one of Patty’s friends, for a 
long interview. Eventually, under intimidation and threats of 
arrest by the State Troopers, they altered their story to align 
with Elderkin’s latest story. At least for a time, as Patty’s friend 
recanted her statement soon after leaving the station. 
 
By using the combined statements of Elderkin and Patty 
Long, and without disclosing the wide-ranging inconsistencies, 
the State Troopers obtained criminal complaints against the 
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Fogle brothers and two others. Then, following hours of 
interrogation, threats, and a steady stream of suggestion in the 
form of details from Elderkin’s statement, Dennis Fogle 
confessed and implicated his brother Lewis. The next day, after 
even more examination by Olson and the State Troopers, 
Dennis Fogle shaped his statement to fit with Elderkin’s most 
recent account. 
 
The case quickly began to unravel as the defendants 
discovered Elderkin’s wandering and inconsistent theories had 
largely powered the criminal complaints. Timely support soon 
arrived from jailhouse informants recruited and counseled by 
the State Troopers. Working collaboratively with law 
enforcement, and pursuing promises of leniency, two of Lewis 
Fogle’s cellmates claimed Fogle confessed to Kathy’s murder. 
Olson and Martin “either knew about, encouraged, or 
permitted” this strategy. (App. at 54.) While the State Troopers 
characterized these statements as voluntary, they and the 
Prosecutors “hid” their role in pursuing the witnesses and their 
offers of favorable treatment. (App. at 54.) 
 
In the meantime, the evidence continued to dissolve. A 
judge barred Elderkin from testifying and suppressed Dennis 
Fogle’s confession. Quickly, the State Troopers obtained a new 
statement from yet another jailhouse witness, again by feeding 
him details and offering leniency. And as before, while Olson 
and Martin “knew about, encouraged, or permitted” this 
strategy, neither the defendants nor the court knew anything 
about their actions. (App. at 56.) 
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D. Fogle’s Conviction is Vacated  
 
Without Elderkin’s testimony or Dennis Fogle’s 
confession, only the charges against Lewis Fogle proceeded to 
trial, some six years after Kathy’s murder. A jury found Fogle 
guilty of second-degree murder, leading to a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2015, Lewis 
Fogle obtained DNA evidence excluding both himself and his 
brother Dennis as the source of semen collected from Kathy. 
On that basis, Lewis Fogle successfully vacated his conviction. 
Soon after, the Commonwealth declined to pursue new 
charges, describing the case as lacking “prosecutorial merit.” 
(App. at 60.) Regrettably, no one has been convicted of the 
tragic rape and murder of Kathy Long. 
 
E. Fogle Brings a Civil Action 
 
Following his release, Fogle sued a host of individuals 
and entities including the State Troopers,2 Olson and Martin, 
and Indiana County. Fogle alleges that Olson and Martin 
violated his due process rights by fabricating inculpatory 
evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence, conspired to 
prosecute him without probable cause, and failed to intervene 
when others were violating his due process rights, all in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Separately, Fogle alleges that 
Indiana County’s policies, practices, and customs amount to 
municipal liability under § 1983. Olson and Martin moved to 
dismiss, arguing prosecutorial immunity insulated their 
conduct from review. Indiana County moved to dismiss as 
well, arguing that it is not liable for Olson’s alleged misconduct 
 
2 Fogle’s claims against the State Troopers are not part 
of this appeal. 
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because the allegations do not stem from his role as a 
policymaker for the County, merely his work as a prosecutor.  
 
The District Court granted the motion in part.3 In a 
Memorandum Opinion, the District Court explained that Olson 
and Martin were not immune because the conduct alleged by 
Fogle was investigative, centered on building a case that 
consistently lacked probable cause. The District Court also 
found Fogle’s allegations against the Prosecutors sufficiently 
grounded in official policymaking to state a claim against 
Indiana County under Monell v. Department of Social Services 
of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Olson, Martin, 
and Indiana County appeal that decision. 
 
II.  OUR LIMITED JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DENIALS OF 
IMMUNITY 
  
As a court of limited review, we begin by confirming 
our jurisdiction. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to review “final decisions of the district courts.” 
A final decision “does not necessarily mean the last order 
possible to be made in a case,” and can include interlocutory 
 
3 Fogle also brought federal and state malicious 
prosecution claims (later withdrawn) and a respondeat 
superior claim (later dismissed). 
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appeals falling within the “collateral order” doctrine. Mitchell 
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–25 (1985).  
 
A. Fogle’s § 1983 Claims Against Olson and Martin  
  
The parties agree that we have jurisdiction over Olson 
and Martin’s appeal. They are correct, and we may review an 
“interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s order denying 
absolute . . . immunity . . . to the extent that the order turns on 
issues of law.” Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 
134 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 
187–88 (3d Cir. 2017). Review of a district court’s order 
denying a motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds is 
plenary.4 Yarris, 465 F.3d at 134. 
 
B. Fogle’s Municipal Liability Claim Against Indiana 
County 
 
But the collateral order exception does not reach 
Indiana County’s appeal. Unlike the claims against Olson and 
Martin, the County may not raise absolute immunity as a 
defense to a claim of municipal liability. See Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). That is because a 
 
4 “We apply the same standard that district courts apply 
at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and our review is limited to the 
contents of the complaint and any attached exhibits. We are 
thus concerned with neither the accuracy of the facts alleged 
nor the merits of [Fogle’s] underlying claims.” Yarris, 465 
F.3d at 134 (internal citation omitted). We also “construe the 
facts in the manner most favorable to [Fogle], in order to 
determine whether the state officials are entitled to absolute . . . 
immunity from any claims based on their alleged conduct.” Id.   
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“municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or 
agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.” Id. So Indiana 
County cannot rely on the Prosecutors’ alleged absolute 
immunity to defend against its own alleged violations of 
§ 1983. So too, it cannot satisfy the exception to the final 
judgment rule for interlocutory review of an order denying 
absolute immunity. Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 
35, 37–38, 41–43 (1995); see also In re Montgomery County, 
215 F.3d 367, 375–76 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
No other jurisdictional hook applies. As Indiana 
County’s appeal does not arise from a final judgment or fall 
into the collateral order exception, it is premature, and we will 
dismiss. 
 
III.  THE NARROW DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
  
 Olson and Martin do not just deny Fogle’s allegations. 
They argue that the truth of Fogle’s claims does not matter, 
because as prosecutors they enjoy absolute immunity from the 
defense of civil actions and the “right not to stand trial.” In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 373. Fogle argues that the 
specific path Olson and Martin allegedly pursued during the 
investigation of Kathy’s murder—characterized by 
investigation, not advocacy—lifts the veil of immunity at this 
stage. Parsing precedent in the fact-specific context of absolute 
immunity is notoriously tricky and turns not on black-letter 
rules, but on a “meticulous analysis” of the Prosecutors’ 
actions. Light v. Haws, 472 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 2007). So we 
begin with the basics, looking to the history, purpose, and 
scope of the doctrine of absolute immunity. And with that 
context established, we conclude that Fogle has alleged claims 
based on actions by Olson and Martin outside the traditional 
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policy limitations that define absolute immunity. As a result, 
his complaint survives a motion to dismiss.  
 
A. Absolute Immunity and § 1983 
 
1. The Legislative Background 
  
 The law now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was first 
passed by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.5 The 1871 
Act created a federal cause of action allowing citizens to sue a 
state or local official in federal court for violating 
“constitutional rights, privileges and immunities” through an 
“abuse of his position.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 
(1961); see also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
This new private right of action flowed from earlier attempts 
by Congress to use the powers granted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to eradicate the lingering damage caused by 
slavery.6 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171. It targeted organized 
 
5 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for 
Other Purposes, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1996)); see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 
336–37 (1983); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and 
the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
394, 398–400 (1982). Congress amended the law and 
reenacted it as Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. 
Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874). See Chapman v. Hous. Welfare 
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979). 
6 The 1871 Act built on the foundations of the 
Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, which, in turn, 




terrorism against African Americans, including growing 
concerns that “Klan members and sympathizers controlled or 
influenced the administration of state criminal justice.”7 
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983). Despite these 
legislative efforts, obstacles to the protections the Act offered 
to citizens quickly emerged.8 But by the 1960s, the Supreme 
 
supra, at 398–99. The 1871 Act authorized individual suits 
alleging deprivation of constitutional rights. Chapman, 441 
U.S. at 608. Congress expanded the remedy to include 
violations of federal law in 1874. Id. at 608–09. 
7 The 1871 Act earned the name “the Ku Klux Klan 
Act.” See Chapman, 441 U.S. at 628 (Powell, J., concurring); 
see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) (“The 
specific historical catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was 
the campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented 
by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying decent citizens their 
civil and political rights.”); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 
244 (1871) (reprinting message from President Ulysses S. 
Grant to Congress seeking legislation to protect civil rights). 
8 One year after the 1871 Act’s adoption, the Supreme 
Court narrowly confined the rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to those “which owe their existence to the Federal 
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its 
laws.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872). Soon 
after, the Court held that “members of a white militia who had 
brutally murdered as many as 165 black Louisianans 
congregating outside a courthouse had not deprived the victims 
of their privileges as American citizens.” McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 808–09 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (discussing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 




Court’s incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights against the 
states meant that § 1983 again provided a federal remedy 
against state officials who abused their office by acting “under 
color of” state law.9 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see David Rittgers, 
Connick v. Thompson, An Immunity that Admits of (Almost) 
No Liabilities, 2011 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 209–10 (2011). 
Along the way, a new barrier arrived in the form of judicially 
created immunities from suit.   
 
 
conspiracy penalties in the 1871 Act could not apply against an 
individual participating in a lynching leading to one death and 
the beating of four men in state custody. United States v. 
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883). “The effect of such a narrow 
judicial construction of state action and ‘privileges and 
immunities’ on section 1983 was devastating.” Developments 
in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
1133, 1161 (1977). Indeed, “[d]espite continuing infringement 
of the civil liberties of the freedmen and their descendants, 
virtually no actions were brought under the statute.” Id.; see 
also Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an 
Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 Ind. L. J. 361, 363 (1951) 
(noting only twenty-one cases brought under the relevant 
portions of the Third Civil Rights Act between 1871 and 1920). 
9 The phrase “by color of” dates to at least the thirteenth 
century and refers to an abuse of authority by a governmental 
official exceeding, rather than conforming to, the law. Steven 
L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 91 Mich. 
L. Rev. 323, 325 (1992).  
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2.  The Extra-Textual Origins of Immunity in 
§ 1983 Actions 
 
 The text of § 1983 does not provide any immunities 
from suit. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986). Rather, 
“[i]t purports to subject ‘[e]very person’ acting under color of 
state law to liability for depriving any other person in the 
United States of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws.’”10 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 
(1991) (second alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983). Yet in a line of cases dating back more than half a 
century, the Supreme Court “has consistently recognized . . . 
that § 1983 was not meant ‘to abolish wholesale all common-
law immunities.’” Id. (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 
554 (1967)). Instead, the Court held that “[c]ertain immunities 
were so well established in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, 
that ‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so 
provided had it wished to abolish’ them.” Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Pierson, 386 
U.S. at 554–55). As a result, “§ 1983 is to be read in harmony 
with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather 
than in derogation of them.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
418 (1976). “To that end, the Court has identified two kinds of 
immunities under § 1983: qualified immunity and absolute 
immunity.” Yarris, 465 F.3d at 135. “Most public officials are 
entitled only to qualified immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)). Under 
 
10 The clarity of the text prompted Justice Douglas to 
remark “[t]o most, ‘every person’ would mean every person, 
not every person except judges.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 




qualified immunity, “government officials are not subject to 
damages liability for the performance of their discretionary 
functions when ‘their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.’”11 Id. (quoting Harlow, 
457 U.S. at 818). 
 
3. The Functional Approach to Absolute Immunity 
for Prosecutorial Conduct 
 
 The absolute immunity extended to official actions was, 
for a time, grounded by a historical approach. Under this view, 
“some officials perform ‘special functions’ which, because of 
their similarity to functions that would have been immune 
when Congress enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection 
from damages liability.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69 (quoting 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). So courts looked 
for public officials shielded from civil suits at common law. 
Judges were an easy fit, as the Court found records of complete 
immunity dating back centuries. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 
335, 346–48 (1871) (“The principle, therefore, which exempts 
judges of courts of superior or general authority from liability 
in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their 
 
11 There is growing concern that the doctrine of 
qualified immunity has likewise “diverged from the historical 
inquiry mandated by the statute.” Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1871–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also 
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting); Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 
2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 




judicial functions, obtains in all countries where there is any 
wellordered system of jurisprudence.”); see also Yates v. 
Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291–92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) 
(discussing judicial immunity in English common law); 
Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2018). 
Jurors, too, had long been immune. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 
n.20 (“The immunity of grand jurors, an almost equally 
venerable common-law tenet . . . also has been adopted in this 
country.”); Butz, 438 U.S. at 509–10 (describing immunity 
extended to both grand and petit jurors). But prosecutors were 
a different story, as the modern office of a public prosecutor 
was uncommon in 1871.12 Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11. So 
instead, courts departed from the historical approach, noting 
both the post-1871 “American cases addressing the availability 
of malicious prosecution actions against public prosecutors” 
and “the policy considerations underlying the firmly 
established common-law rules providing absolute immunity 
for judges and jurors.” Id. At its core, absolute prosecutorial 
immunity was not born out of pre-§1983 tradition, but evolved 
 
12 See also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“There was, of course, no such thing as absolute 
prosecutorial immunity when § 1983 was enacted.”). Rather, 
as scholars have found, the first judicial decision granting 
absolute prosecutorial immunity appeared more than twenty-
five years after the passage of § 1983. See Margaret Z. Johns, 
Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. 
Rev. 53, 113–16 (2005) (citing Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. 
124 (Mass. 1854); Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 
1896)); see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123–24 (acknowledging 





as new common law reflecting “‘a balance’ of ‘evils.’”13 Van 
de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340 (2009) (quoting 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 
 But there are limits placed on that balance scale. While 
the Supreme Court has extended the defense of absolute 
immunity to certain prosecutorial functions, it has not 
blanketed “the actions of a prosecutor . . . merely because they 
are performed by a prosecutor.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. 
Instead, courts must “focus upon the functional nature of the 
activities rather than [the prosecutor’s] status” to determine 
whether absolute immunity is warranted. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 
430; accord Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. Applying this functional 
approach, the Supreme Court has “emphasized that the official 
seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that 
such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns, 
500 U.S. at 486. Indeed, “[t]he presumption is that qualified 
rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect 
government officials in the exercise of their duties.” Id. at 486–
87.    
 
 That functional test separates advocacy from everything 
else, entitling a prosecutor to absolute immunity only for work 
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 
process.” Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). In that regard, 
the Court has found, for instance, that prosecutors are immune 
 
13 See, e.g., Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 
1926) (holding prosecutors “should be no more liable to private 
suits for what they say and do in the discharge of their duties 
than are the judges and jurors”). The Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision in Yaselli in a per curiam opinion citing two cases 
on judicial immunity. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). 
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from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a 
prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, including “soliciting false 
testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and 
probable cause hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 
1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s case at trial, Imbler, 
424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present 
evidence, Burns, 500 U.S. at 491–92. See also Van de Kamp, 
555 U.S. at 344 (finding prosecutors absolutely immune from 
claims arising from conduct “directly connected with the 
conduct of a trial” that “necessarily require[d] legal knowledge 
and the exercise of related discretion”). 
 
 By contrast, a prosecutor’s “investigatory functions that 
do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a 
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to 
absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Determining the 
precise function that a prosecutor is performing is a fact-
specific analysis. For instance, “[a] prosecutor neither is, nor 
should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has 
probable cause to have anyone arrested.” Id. at 274. Before 
probable cause for an arrest, a prosecutor’s “mission at that 
time [i]s entirely investigative in character.” Id. “Of course, a 
determination of probable cause does not guarantee a 
prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all actions 
taken afterwards. Even after that determination, . . . a 
prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’ that is 
entitled to only qualified immunity.” Id. at 274 n.5. It follows 
that when prosecutors function as investigators, rather than 
advocates, they enjoy no right to absolute immunity. Id. at 
275–76; see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 (observing that 
absolute immunity is not so “expansive” as to protect all 
“direct participation in purely investigative activity”); Kalina, 
522 U.S. at 129–31 (declining to extend absolute immunity 
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where a prosecutor makes a false statement of fact in an 
affidavit supporting an arrest warrant).  
 
 So to determine whether Olson and Martin may invoke 
absolute immunity as a complete bar to civil liability, we must 
parse these fine lines between advocacy and investigation. And 
while “[i]t is tempting to derive bright-line rules” from the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, we have “cautioned against 
such categorical reasoning” to “preserve the fact-based nature 
of the inquiry.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 210 (3d Cir. 
2008); see also Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. As a result, “our 
prosecutorial immunity analysis focuses on the unique facts of 
each case and requires careful dissection of the prosecutor’s 
actions.” Odd, 538 F.3d at 210. Although the fair distance from 
the ordinary language of § 1983 and “the ‘functional 
categories’ approach to immunity questions . . . make faithful 
adherence to the common law embodied in [it] very difficult,” 
that is the path we must follow. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 135 (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 
 But it should not be easy travel. Once asserted, the onus 
is on the prosecutor to demonstrate “that absolute immunity 
should attach to each act he allegedly committed that gave rise 
to a cause of action.” Light, 472 F.3d at 80. And that burden is 
uniquely heavy. Odd, 538 F.3d at 207 (quoting Light, 472 F.3d 
at 80–81). Indeed, “[a]sserting a[n] . . . immunity defense via a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion subjects the defendant to a more 
challenging standard of review than would apply on summary 
judgment.’’ Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 
2004). That is because in a motion to dismiss, “it is the 
defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint that is 
scrutinized.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996). 
Meaning to earn the protections of absolute immunity, a 
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defendant must show that the conduct triggering absolute 
immunity “clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.” 
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
 Immunity, therefore, is neither one-size-fits-all, nor a 
one-way street. Our analysis “has two basic steps, though they 
tend to overlap.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 332 (3d 
Cir. 2011). First, we “ascertain just what conduct forms the 
basis for the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. Then, we 
“determine what function (prosecutorial, administrative, 
investigative, or something else entirely) that act served,” id., 
to determine whether the Prosecutors have carried their 
“burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the 
function in question,” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. Thus, while we 
tend to discuss prosecutorial immunity based on alleged acts, 
our ultimate analysis is whether a defendant has established 
absolute prosecutorial immunity from a given claim.    
 
 Using this framework, we conclude that Olson and 
Martin are not, at this stage, entitled to absolute immunity from 
Fogle’s § 1983 claims if they relate to investigative, not 
prosecutorial, activity.  
 
B. Applying the Functional Test to Olson and Martin’s 
Absolute Immunity Defense 
 
Does absolute immunity bar each of Fogle’s § 1983 
claims? The answer requires a “careful dissection of the 
prosecutor[s’] actions” that support Fogle’s claims. Odd, 653 
F.3d at 210. 
  
 Fogle raises several claims against Olson and Martin: 
violation of Fogle’s due process rights by fabricating evidence 
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and withholding material exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence; civil rights conspiracy; and failure to intervene. All 
of these claims hinge on the same conduct: Olson and Martin’s 
roles in obtaining statements from Elderkin, Patty Long, 
Dennis Fogle, and the jailhouse informants; their initiation of 
the prosecution against Lewis Fogle; and their concealment of 
their tactics from the court and from the defense. We will 
“carefully defin[e] [each] act that gave rise to [Fogle’s] suit” in 
turn. Odd, 538 F.3d at 202.  
 
1. Olson and Martin’s Conduct in Procuring 
Elderkin’s Statements 
 
We start with the saga of Elderkin. Olson allegedly 
“arranged for an English teacher with no formal training in 
hypnosis to ‘hypnotize’ Elderkin.” (App. at 48.) Then, Olson 
and the State Troopers directed “the ‘hypnotist’ [to use] undue 
suggestion to obtain a statement from Elderkin implicating” 
Fogle. (App. at 48.) Immediately afterward, working alongside 
the State Troopers, Olson took another statement from 
Elderkin and this time, “there were no longer large gaps in 
Elderkin’s memory, the account was no longer hazy, and he 
expressed little uncertainty about what had occurred.” (App. at 
48.) It was this post-hypnosis statement that provided the 
probable cause to arrest Fogle. 
 
Olson’s role in obtaining Elderkin’s statement 
constitutes investigatory conduct, a conclusion flowing from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Burns v. Reed. In Burns, a 
prosecutor claimed absolute immunity for providing police 
officers guidance on how to use hypnosis to obtain a witness 
statement. 500 U.S. at 482–83. The Supreme Court held that a 
prosecutor “advising the police in the investigative phase of a 
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criminal case” did not warrant absolute immunity. Id. at 493. 
Olson’s conduct goes beyond advice, and allegedly included 
finding the hypnotist, encouraging undue suggestion, and 
participating in Elderkin’s post-hypnosis questioning. By 
choreographing and securing Elderkin’s statement, Olson 
played “the detective’s role” to “search[] for the clues and 
corroboration,” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, and establish 
probable cause to arrest Fogle. Those acts do not enjoy 
absolute immunity.  
 
While Martin’s alleged conduct stands in a different 
light, it leads to the same conclusion. The complaint alleges 
that “Defendants knew that Elderkin’s post-hypnosis 
statement, like his previous statements, was wholly unreliable, 
untrustworthy, and entirely false” and “knew it was 
contradicted by evidence obtained earlier during the 
investigation.” (App. at 49.) That could mean Martin was just 
as involved as Olson in shaping Elderkin’s testimony. Or it 
might mean Martin learned of the discrepancies later, well into 
his preparation for trial. But recall that for Martin to succeed 
on a motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity, “the 
defense must clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” 
Wilson, 878 F.2d at 776. While more scrutiny, and additional 
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facts, may produce a different result, Martin has not yet carried 
his burden.14 
 
2. Patty Long’s Statement 
 
Fogle also alleges that “Defendants used improper 
tactics to obtain false evidence that would eliminate 
inconsistencies, corroborate Elderkin’s statement and help 
them close the case.” (App. at 50.) To accomplish that goal, 
Fogle claims, the State Troopers questioned Patty Long until 
she “adopted a new, false story, fed to [her].” (App. at 50.) 
 
14 We have recognized that where “a lack of factual 
specificity in a complaint prevents the defendant from framing 
a fact-specific qualified immunity defense, which, in turn, 
precludes the district court from engaging in a meaningful 
qualified immunity analysis[,] [t]he appropriate remedy is the 
granting of a defense motion for a more definite statement 
under Federal Rule 12(e).” Thomas v. Independence Township, 
463 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Weiland v. Palm 
Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 n.10 (11th 
Cir. 2015). This rings equally true for invocations of absolute 
immunity. Courts should be mindful that where the allegations 
in a complaint do not require a more definite statement, 
immunity defenses will often require the benefit of discovery. 
Russell, 905 F.3d at 253 (quoting Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301) 
(noting “summary judgment remains a useful tool for 
precluding insubstantial claims from proceeding to trial”); see 
also Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 775 (7th Cir. 
2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Rule 12(b)(6) is a mismatch for immunity and 
almost always a bad ground for dismissal.”). We defer to the 
District Court to determine the best path. 
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Fogle then alleges that “[i]n the probable cause affidavit they 
presented to the magistrate judge,” Olson and Martin failed to 
report the “past inconsistent statements of Patty Long.” (App. 
at 51–52.) But failing to report the alleged inconsistencies 
while “appearing before a judge and presenting evidence” 
involves the Prosecutors’ conduct as advocates, where they 
enjoy absolute immunity. Burns, 500 U.S. at 491. So the 
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct.   
 
3. Dennis Fogle’s Statement  
 
Next, Lewis Fogle alleges that the State Troopers 
interrogated his brother Dennis twice in the twenty-four-hour 
period after his arrest. During the first interrogation, the State 
Troopers “worked to coerce a confession from Dennis” by 
“using threats, intimidation, and . . . feeding him non-public 
details from Elderkin’s statement about the way the crimes 
supposedly had occurred.” (App. at 52.) By the next day, Olson 
joined the fray and “used the same improper tactics to obtain 
another false and fabricated” statement from Dennis. (App. at 
52.) And to cover up their misconduct, the Prosecutors 
collectively “misrepresented in written and oral reports that 
Dennis Fogle had volunteered the ‘confession’ and subsequent 
statement without coercion or suggestion.” (App. at 52.)  
 
Olson’s claim of immunity for this conduct is temporal: 
he argues that since Dennis’s interrogation occurred after 
arrest, the “judicial process was clearly in motion” entitling 
him to immunity. (Opening Br. at 20.) But “[w]e have rejected 
bright-line rules that would treat the timing of the prosecutor’s 
action (e.g. pre- or postindictment), or its location (i.e. in- or 
out-of-court), as dispositive.” Odd, 538 F.3d at 210. That 
approach sensibly counsels that we “not view the filing of a 
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complaint as a foolproof measure of the commencement of 
‘quasi-judicial’ activity.” Kulwicki, 969 F.2d at 1466. Instead, 
the “key to the absolute immunity determination is not the 
timing of the investigation relative to a judicial proceeding, but 
rather the underlying function that the investigation serves and 
the role the [prosecutor] occupies in carrying it out.” B.S. v. 
Somerset County, 704 F.3d 250, 270 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 
As alleged, Olson’s conduct in interviewing Dennis 
Fogle was not that of an advocate. Rather, the interview 
occurred at the end of a long chain of investigative events led, 
or supervised, by Olson. Recall that without Elderkin’s 
hypnotic recollections, there may have been no probable cause 
for Dennis Fogle’s arrest. Allegedly, Olson knew this; indeed, 
Lewis Fogle claims Olson’s active participation fueled the 
entire investigation. For that reason, Olson was not acting as 
an advocate “interviewing witnesses as he prepare[d] for trial”; 
instead, he was investigating the theory of his case by 
“searching for . . . clues.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. On that 
basis, and at this stage, Olson does not receive absolute 
immunity for his role in obtaining Dennis Fogle’s statement or 
concealing the methods leading to his confession.  
  
 Less clear are Martin’s interactions with Dennis Fogle. 
The complaint alleges that “Defendants misrepresented in 
written and oral reports that Dennis Fogle had volunteered the 
‘confession’ and subsequent statement without coercion or 
suggestion, and otherwise hid their misconduct with respect to 
Dennis Fogle’s statements.” (App. at 52–53.) Based on this 
assertion, Martin may have functioned as an advocate, an 
investigator, or played no role at all. While discovery may 
produce a different result, at this stage, Martin has not carried 
his burden to enjoy the protections of absolute immunity for 
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his conduct related to Dennis Fogle’s confession. See Yarris, 
465 F.3d at 138 (holding that, where it is not clear from a 
complaint whether a prosecutor’s action was investigative or 
quasi-judicial, a motion to dismiss based on absolute immunity 
is properly denied). 
 
4. Statements by the Jailhouse Informants 
 
Fogle alleges that Olson and Martin “knew about, 
encouraged, or permitted” the State Troopers to fabricate 
statements from three jailhouse informants, each describing 
Fogle’s purported confession to the crime. (App. at 54, 56.) 
Again, Olson and Martin assert that absolute immunity protects 
this conduct because it “occurred after the initiation of criminal 
charges.” (Opening Br. at 18.) And again, relying on our 
decision in Yarris, the Prosecutors call for a bright line 
extending absolute immunity to all conduct surrounding 
informants after the filing of charges. But once again, that line 
is unsupported by our precedent.   
 
Our role is not to look at the “timing of the prosecutor’s 
action (e.g. pre- or postindictment),” but at the function being 
performed. Odd, 538 F.3d at 210. In Yarris, after closely 
reviewing the facts, we held that the prosecutors were entitled 
to absolute immunity from a claim that they had obtained a 
false statement from a jailhouse informant. 465 F.3d at 139. 
Our conclusion turned on the attorneys’ work in preparation 
for trial with the prosecutors acting as “advocates rather than 
investigators.” Id. In contrast, Fogle alleges that the 
Prosecutors not only solicited false statements from jailhouse 
informants, but deliberately encouraged the State Troopers to 
do the same “[k]nowing their evidence was weak” (App. at 53), 
given the fabricated (Elderkin), inconsistent (Kathy’s sister 
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and friend), and coerced (Dennis Fogle) witness statements. 
Thus, the Prosecutors were functioning not as advocates, but 
as investigators seeking to generate evidence in support of a 
prosecution. This illustrates why “a determination of probable 
cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from 
liability for all actions taken afterwards,” because “[w]hen the 
functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same, as they 
were here, the immunity that protects them is also the same.” 
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5, 276. Accepting the facts alleged 
as true and drawing all inferences in favor of Fogle, neither 
Olson nor Martin have carried their burden to demonstrate that 
they are entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct at this 
stage. 
 
5. The Prosecutors’ Conduct at Hearings and Trial 
  
 Finally, some of Fogle’s claims rest on a host of actions 
within the Prosecutors’ duties as advocates during the judicial 
process. He alleges that at hearings and at trial the Prosecutors 
withheld material exculpatory evidence from defense counsel, 
the court, and the jury; filed a criminal complaint without 
probable cause; and committed perjury before and during trial. 
These activities are “intimately associated with the judicial 
phase of the criminal process.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486 (quoting 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). And all enjoy absolute immunity. See 
id. at 487–92 (wrongful prosecution); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 
(beginning prosecution and presenting the state’s case); Smith 
v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 199 n.18 (3d Cir. 2000) (withholding 
evidence); Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 630 n.28 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (perjury), overruled on other grounds by Rolo v. 
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City Investing Co. Liquidating Tr., 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 
1998).  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, Olson and Martin are absolutely immune only 
for their alleged conduct in launching the prosecution against 
Fogle, failing to include information about Patty Long’s 
previous statements in their probable cause affidavit, 
withholding material exculpatory and impeachment evidence, 
and making misrepresentations to the court. But Olson and 
Martin are not, at this stage, entitled to absolute immunity for 
their alleged conduct in procuring Elderkin’s statements, 
Dennis Fogle’s confession, or the jailhouse informant 
statements. As these actions implicate all of Fogle’s claims, we 
will affirm the District Court’s decision to deny dismissal 
based on absolute immunity. We leave for the District Court 
on remand to determine which of Fogle’s claims against Olson 
and Martin survive on the merits. And, of course, Olson and 
Martin are still entitled to seek qualified immunity.   
 
Our decision offers little to celebrate. Lewis Fogle can 
move forward with some, but not all, of the allegations in his 
complaint against the Prosecutors. The Prosecutors must 
explain some, but not all, of their choices. And decades later, 
answers and earthly peace still elude Deann “Kathy” Long and 
her grieving family. But the doctrine of absolute immunity is 
fact-bound, seeking to pinpoint the moments when 
investigation becomes advocacy, with the curtain of immunity 
raising and lowering in response. Although absolute 
prosecutorial immunity exceeds both the doctrine’s historic 
scope and the statutory text, we cannot use the original 
meaning of a statute as a “makeweight” against precedent, 
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United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 1002 (11th Cir. 2019), 
nor hand-pick binding decisions to follow. Bosse v. Oklahoma, 
137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016). So we will affirm the District Court’s 
order denying Olson and Martin’s motion to dismiss based on 
absolute immunity as far as the claims depend on non-
prosecutorial activities and dismiss Indiana County’s appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction.  
